Calgary (City) v. Canada, 2012 SCC 20

On appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal.

Taxation ― Goods and services tax ― Single supply or multiple supplies ― City acquiring and constructing transit facilities ― City claiming and receiving public service body rebates for portion of GST paid ― City also claiming input tax credits in respect of GST paid on purchases made for transit facilities ― Whether acquisition and construction of transit facilities constituting an exempt supply, a taxable supply or both ― Whether “transit facilities services” a taxable supply to the Province separate from exempt supply of “public transit services” to public ― City Transportation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C‑14 ― Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E‑15, ss. 123(1), 169(1), Sched. V, Part VI, ss. 1 and 24.

The City of Calgary acquired and constructed transit infrastructure, facilities, and equipment for the use of the Calgary public as part of the municipal transit system pursuant to the City Transportation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C‑14 (“CTA”). Under the CTA, the Province of Alberta entered into funding agreements with the City. The City paid GST in respect of its purchases for the acquisition and construction of the transit facilities. The provision of a “municipal transit service” is an exempt supply under the terms of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E‑15 (“ETA”). Input tax credits (“ITCs”) cannot be claimed with respect to purchases made for the purpose of providing an exempt supply. Prior to 2003, the City claimed public service body rebates for 57.14% of the GST paid. In January 2003, the City filed a GST return in which it claimed ITCs for the difference between the GST paid for the transit facilities and the rebates that the City had previously received. The Minister of National Revenue rejected the City’s position denying the City’s claim for ITCs; the Tax Court of Canada agreed with the City, allowing the appeal and remitted the matter to the Minister for reassessment. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeal.

Held : Dismissed, with costs.

Calgary (City) v. Canada, 2012 SCC 20

McCauley Community League v Edmonton (City), 2012 ABCA 86

Development permit – Expiry – Apartment Housing – Extended Medical Treatment Services – Edmonton – McCauley Community League – Subdivision and Development Appeal Board – Niginan Housing Ventures

[1] The appellant Community League attempted to appeal a development permit given to the respondent Niginan Housing Ventures. The respondent Subdivision and Development Appeal Board dismissed the appeal on the basis that it had not been filed within 14 days, as required by s. 686(1) of the Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c. M-26. The Board also concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to decide if the development permit had expired. The appellant was granted leave to appeal further to this Court: McCauley Community League v Edmonton (City), 2011 ABCA 327.

[46] By way of postscript it is worth noting how unhelpful it was for the development officer not to give notice of this development permit to the appellant and other interested parties, even if it was a Class A permit. It was well known that this was a controversial development that was opposed by some people. The failure to give notice created great uncertainty on this file. It meant, even on the position taken by the respondents, that the appeal period on the development permit issued May 5, 2008 did not begin to run until over 2.5 years later in November 2010. While the Bylaw may not require notice of Class A permits, that does not mean that giving notice is not a good idea. As was pointed out in Coventry Homes at para. 32, one of the reasons for the short appeal period is to provide certainty to the developer. Failing to give notice of development permits that are obviously controversial helps no one.

Held: The appeal is allowed.

McCauley Community League v Edmonton (City), 2012 ABCA 86

A.R.W. Development Corporation v. Beaumont (Town), 2011 ABCA 382

(Reasons for Judgment Reserved of The Honourable Mr. Justice O’Ferrall). “This appeal raises the issue of whether a municipality can replace off-site levies it agreed to in 1989 with higher off-site levies imposed by bylaw in 2008. More specifically, this appeal is from a chambers judge’s refusal to declare an off-site levy bylaw enacted by the respondent Town of Beaumont (Town) inapplicable to the appellant developer’s remaining undeveloped land despite the parties’ agreement on a formula for calculating such levies for the developer’s entire development area: ARW Development Corp v Beaumont (Town), 2010 ABQB 245, 492 AR 269″.

A.R.W. Development Corporation v. Beaumont (Town), 2011 ABCA 382

Edmonton (City) v. Innvest Properties MacDonald Nominee Ltd., 2011 ABCA 333

(Reasons for Judgment Reserved) “The issue in this appeal is whether s. 294(1)(b) of the Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26 (the “MGA”) authorizes the City of Edmonton (the “City”) to request a document to assist it in preparing an assessment of property that is not the subject of a physical inspection”.

Edmonton (City) v. Innvest Properties MacDonald Nominee Ltd., 2011 ABCA 333

 

Prairie Communities Development Corp. v. Okotoks (Town), 2011 ABCA 315

 (Reasons for Judgment Reserved) “The Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26, (MGA), empowers municipalities to impose off-site levies in respect of land that is to be developed or subdivided. Such levies are chargeable with respect to new or expanded facilities or infrastructure, of a designated nature or kind, which are constructed off-site but which are required by, and benefit, the lands sought to be developed or subdivided. The levies can be imposed as a condition of granting a development permit or subdivision approval. Typically, the levies are borne by the initial developers of the subject lands, who, in turn, attempt to recoup these charges from the purchasers of the land after it has been developed or subdivided.

On September 14, 2009, the respondent, Town ofOkotoks, (the Town), passed a Resolution enacting Bylaw 04-09, (the Bylaw), which imposed Off-Site Levies for 2009. The Town also approved in the same Resolution a form of agreement entitled the Contribution and Recovery of Expense Agreement, (Contribution Agreement). The Contribution Agreement set out the terms of an agreement contemplated to be entered into with developers. It provided for payment of fees with respect to off-site facilities and services of a kind and nature not designated in the MGA. As these fees fall outside the statutory grant of authority allowing for the imposition of off site levies, the Town has treated them as being payable by developers as a matter of contract, and relies upon its natural person powers to negotiate an agreement for that purpose.

The appellant, Prairie Communities Development Corp, (the Developer), objected both to the Bylaw and to the Resolution adopting the Contribution Agreement. It filed an Originating Notice seeking to quash the Bylaw for non-compliance with the MGA and Alberta Regulation 48/2004 entitled “Principles and Criteria for Off-site Levies Regulation”, (the Regulation). The Developer also challenged the validity of the Contribution Agreement, and the Resolution adopting it, on the basis that the fees sought to be collected were unauthorized levies.

A chambers judge dismissed the application: Prairie Communities Development Corp v Okotoks (Town), 2010 ABQB 359, 492 AR 247. The Developer appeals.”

Prairie Communities Development Corp. v. Okotoks (Town), 2011 ABCA 315